I have done a couple of Development Studies courses over the past two years at uni, and I’m kinda disappointed that there are no more undergraduate units with this focus that I can take next year. The course I took this semester (African Politics and Globalization), has been good. Our tutor avoided the easy path of non-reflexive, self-defeating Afropessimism, and instead encouraged us to interrogate the stereotypes surrounding African political economies ( note the plural). He also encouraged us to make educated and innovative suggestions regarding what we think has been done wrong, and what needs to be done to bring about future change. Some primary points that were emphasised in the course:
- ‘post-colonialism’ has enormous symbolic capital, but does very little to explain current political, social and economic issues in Africa . It is a form of linguistic violence, suppressing narratives of economic crises, civil war, rape, poverty, homophobia, institutionalised patriarchy, and, inter alia, lost intergenerational knowledge transfer.
- GDP growth is too often conflated with pro-poor growth, when they are in fact two different things (yes, to an extent they are interdependent, but they are not reducible to one another)
So that is obviously not all I learnt, but it is a *brief* summary. For anyone who’s interested, or is doing an essay on this in the future, I’ve also included a paper I wrote for the course below. It was on politics in Uganda, and we basically had to choose three big issues and write about them. As follows:
Three primary issues in Uganda at present are the prevalence of poverty, civil unrest and the prevalence of neopatrimonial politics in government. Whereas economic growth in Uganda was more broad-based during the 1990s, in recent years it has exacerbated income inequality. To deal with this issue, more attention needs to be paid to the developmentalist model of pro-poor growth. Whilst civil unrest in Uganda has reportedly been decreasing over the years, the humanitarian issues created by rebel activities (and the government, in dealing with them) are significant, and worthy of examination. Uganda’s neopatrimonial politics are also of concern, due to the corruption and lack of governmental transparency that it has caused. The culture of greed and loyalty based politics surrounding neopatrimonialism is something which is heavily ingrained in Uganda, and larger institutional change needs to occur for it to be effectively dealt with.
Poverty
In 2005, 52 per cent of the Ugandan population were living below the international poverty line of $1.25 per day (UNICEF 2005: Internet). Despite this, reports by the international community have a tendency to characterise Uganda as one of the ‘success’ stories of international aid (OECD 2005: Internet, 3). Such characterisations tend to draw on Uganda’s relative macroeconomic success, for example in lowering inflation and increasing economic growth.The improvements in economic growth are notable, given that in 1990 economic growth stood at 4.5 per cent, and in 2007 it was 8.6 per cent- almost doubling in size (CIA 2009: Internet). However, there have been criticisms that Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Plan, introduced in 1997 and made into a PRSP in 2004, focuses too much on macroeconomic stability at the expense of poverty reduction (Hickey, 2005:1003). The previously held assumption that increases in economic growth will trickle down to the poorest in society has largely been negatived in the case of Uganda, where income inequality and poverty has predominantly increased over the past decade or so (Hickey, 2005: 997). In 1992, the Gini Coefficient stood at 0.36, but rose to 0.43 in 2002/3 (IMF 2005: Internet, 13).Although it decreased to 0.408 in 2005/6, the figures clearly demonstrate that income inequality is worse today in Uganda than it was in the early 1990s, despite considerable economic growth over this period.
In a geographical sense, poverty is disproportionately experienced by Ugandans living in rural areas (91.9 per cent of the chronic poor), and the conflict effected North (30.1 per of the chronic poor) (Hickey, 2005: 997). In 2002/3 the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line was 22 per cent in central Uganda, but this figure almost tripled to 63 per cent for those living in the Northern district (Nannyonjo,2004: Internet, 9). Rebel activities have been associated with fatalities, abductions, the displacement of people, and widespread insecurity, which has contributed to the creation of an environment conducive of poverty (Hickey 2005:997).
In Uganda, there are wider issues with the way the poverty stricken are at times treated with derision by the government. Academic John Hickey argues that Ugandan political elites have a tendency to, ‘make a close association between long-term poverty and a failure to be ‘‘economically active.’’’ He also claims that the ‘idle peasant’ archetype is a commonly used by the ruling elite. In a presidential speech in 2004, Museveni claimed that many Ugandans involved in the agricultural economy, ‘are stepping on top of each other and not doing anything useful’(Hickey, 2005:1002).
Additionally, there has been evidence to suggest that the poorest people are not necessarily the indended targets of poverty reduction schemes. In discussing the government’s Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), one of the architects of the program stated;
‘the poorest are deficient [sic] in agricultural assets, which brings into question whether or not the PMA will make any difference to the poorest. . . we envisaged that after initial successes with commercialization the poorest would provide labor on maize farms and agro-processing factories. But this was as a wish statement’ (Architect of PMA, 2002 as quoted by Hickey, 2005:1002).
The stereotyping and blaming that occurs by the elite when addressing poverty, is not only ethically problematic (due to the classism inherent in the two statements given above), but also unproductive. It diverts energy and resources away from effectively dealing with poverty issues, whilst obscuring the complexity of long term poverty.
It has been argued that one of the reasons why economic growth in Uganda is not broad-based is that the importance of pro-poor growth has been under-recognised. Kappel, Lay and Steiner state that in order for growth to be pro-poor, emphasis needs to be placed on agricultural, non-farm and informal sectors, as opposed to primarily focussing on industrial sectors (Kappel, Lay and Steiner,2004: Internet,3). They state that pro-poor growth is land and labour intensive, and is focussed on localities with high rates of poverty. In order for developing countries to reap the benefits of broad-based growth, income needs to be redistributed to the poor through progressive taxation, and targeted government expenditure (Kappel, Lay and Steiner,2004: Internet,3). In Uganda, the agricultural sector employs around 70 per cent of the workforce, and yet over the past ten years government spending on agriculture has been decreasing (Byaruhanga 2009:Internet). Further in 1992/3, the agricultural sector accounted for 48 per cent of GDP, whereas in 2002/3 this dropped to 38 per cent (Kappel, Lay and Steiner 2004:Internet, 12). Increased government spending on agriculture is needed to address problems such as inefficient farming practices, a misled dependence on rain-fed-agriculture, inefficient distribution channels and planning mismanagement (Byaruhanga 2009:Internet). It also needs to be recognised that not all members of the population will have the resources or capacity to engage in intensive agricultural production, and as such the importance of non-commercial farming and informal sectors needs to be recognised, and given adequate financial support.
It is also necessary to recognise the effect of Uganda’s high birth rate on the perpetuation of poverty. Uganda has the third highest birthrate in the world, with 6.77 children born per woman (CIA 2009: Internet). The maternal mortality rate is considerable also, and it has been estimated it could be as high as 1, 200 per 100, 000 live births (Okuonzi, 2004: 1635). The high fertility rate, combined with population mobility and the adoption of Western nuclear family structures , has contributed to Uganda’s 2·5 million orphans and other helpless children, who make up a tenth of the entire population(Okuonzi, 2004: 1635). Uganda’s high fertility rates and population growth have been identified as key setbacks to poverty reduction, due to increased human demand for already scarce resources. In order to deal with high fertility rates, and the associated problem of poverty, the government needs to provide better quality and more available reproductive health services, rather than just rely on fragmented humanitarian aid to deal with these issues.
Civil Unrest
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was formed in 1987, as means of rebellion against the government. It operates predominantly in Northern Uganda, but also parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) and Sudan (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:6). Although it has been waning in strength and numbers over the years, it still elicits attention, given the long term sociopolitical effects of its influence on many Ugandans.
There are various humanitarian issues associated with the war. It has been estimated that more than 1.4 million people have been displaced as a result of the conflict(USAID 2003: Internet). HIV prevalence is said to be higher in conflict areas than the rest of Uganda. The abduction of children by the LRA, and the associated child soldier and sex slavery that has resulted, has been said to have a demoralising effect on past and present communal consciousness(USAID 2003: Internet). More generally, academic Klaus Deininger has stated that civil conflict disrupts core social institutions (Deininger, 2003:582). He states that civil war promotes the undermining of institutions such as the police, and also property rights. The naturalisation of violence and crime in the community has negative effects on public morale. Deininger also states that civil conflict creates a less welcoming environment for capital investment, which is precisely the thing which could help rebuild communities in conflict effected areas (Deininger 2003:585).
In 2003, USAID reported that the conflict and insecurity in Northern Uganda resulted in more than $100 million being lost per year in production (USAID 2003:Internet). Another problem with Uganda’s history of civil war is the tendency of government to divert public expenditure away from other output-enhancing which could improve civil life.
In 2003, The Ugandan government announced that it was going to cut expenditure on various government ministries and departments and re-allocate more funds to the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) (Akugizibwe, 2008: Internet). For the 2008/9 budget, the government plans to spend around the same amount on security (from Shs443.2b to Shs453.2b), as it does on health (Shs428.3b to Shs480.5b) (Akugizibwe, 2008: Internet). Such a focus on security stands in marked contrast to other areas of spending, such as justice/law and order (Shs234.6b to Shs242.2b) and agriculture (Shs116.8b to Shs239.2b), both of which have potential to improve civil society.
In the past, the Ugandan government has offered amnesty to those involved in the LRA, as a means of encouraging their retirement from rebel activites, and bringing about peace in the effected regions. In 2004 the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the head of the LRA, Joseph Kony. Kony has responded to the warrant by saying he will not come forward unless he is granted immunity from the charges (Burke-White,2008:Internet). Further, there is a popular conception that ending the civil conflict involves choosing between the competing goals of peace and justice(Burke-White,2008:Internet). On one hand, there is the argument that prosecuting Kony will promote public accountability and strengthen the image of the legal system. However, on the other hand there is public interest in ending the conflict as expediently as possible, and bringing about peace in the region. It has been suggested that means of dealing with the conflict include the strengthening of local government, a more efficient utilisation of pre-existing police budgets and forces, and the continuance of and investment in schemes which provide support for those effected by the conflict (Deininger 2003:589).. In 2003, USAID created a Displaced Children and Orphans Fund, which provides for counselling and vocational training for former child soldiers, abductees, women and the internally displaced ( USAID 2003:Internet). It has also created a Victims of Torture Fund, which supports the rehabilitation and reintegration of adults and children harmed by the rebel forces back into society. Schemes such as this, as well as movements to bring about peace in the region, are necessary to deal with the past and present effects of civil war on the population.
Government
Uganda was a virtual one-party state between 1986 and 2005. During this period, opposition parties were allowed to exist, but under severe restrictions, which prevented them from presenting a considerable challenge to Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) (Tangri and Mwenda, 2008:180). An indication of Museveni’s power was in 2004-5, when he pushed through Parliament amendments to the constitution, including one which changed the law to allow him to run for another term (in preparation for the 2006 election) (Tangri and Mwenda, 2008:180).
In his article, Staying Poor: Exploring the Political Space for Poverty Reduction in Uganda, John Hickey asserts that excessive presidentialism, neopatrimonialism and corruption still characterise Uganda’s political landscape (Hickey, 2005:798). Simply put, Patrimonialism refers to a political system where members of government are instated in return for political support, loyalty and service that coincides with the ruler’s aims (Gordon, 2002:77). Under a patrimonial system, a ruler comes to personify the state, and is not only a key political figure, but also a key military and cultural representative (Sandbrook, 1985 as quoted by Gordon, 2007:77). Another feature is that the ruler may instate family members, or ethnic kinsmen/women, to leading government positions. ‘The purpose of these personalised appointments is to make every office holder feel personally grateful and loyal to the person of the President, instead of the institution of the State’ (Mwenda, 2006 as quoted by Tangri and Mwenda, 2008: 182). Neopatrimonialism is a ‘modern’ form of the traditional patrimonial rule, and is a mixed system. Here, elements of patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule can exist together, in an interwoven state (Erdmann and Engel, 2006: Internet, 9).
In Uganda, Museveni has been marked out for his neopatrimonial ruling style (Hickey 2005:793). Museveni’s wife was appointed as a state minister for Karamoja, his brother is a former minister for micro finance, and his brother-in-law has been appointed as minister for current affairs (The Independent, 2009:Internet). There is also evidence of Museveni’s patrimony in the military, where 74 per cent of the top 23 command positions in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), are occupied by officers from Museveni’s western region. The president also has influence in the business/economic sphere, where some of his relatives and in-laws are well placed. One of the most prominent is Hannington Karuhanga, a chairman of Stanbic Bank and chairman of UGACOF, a leading coffee exporting company(The Independent, 2009:Internet).
There are various sociopolitical issues associated with neopatrimonial rule, including a stifling of democratic participation, governmental arbitrariness, nepotism, political favouritism and corruption. Political academic John Hickey argues that the effect of political arbitrariness on civil society in Uganda is significant (Hickey, 2005:798). He gives an example from early 2000, when at the last minute Museveni withdrew the ‘co-ownership’ clause placed in The Land Act, which was supposed to address gendered poverty issues in Uganda (Hickey, 2005:798). The clause was of particular relevance to improving women’s livelihood, given the tendency of widowed females to enter long-term poverty traps, as a result of the asset stripping following the death of their husbands (Hickey, 2005:798). Hickey also draws links between neopatrimonialism and a lack of proper democratic participation in Uganda. He states that a large number of the chronically poor, including the landless, people with mental dys-abilities and the elderly do not receive poverty quotas, whereas groups such as the army and workers, do ( Hickey, 2005:798).
On the point of corruption, in 2005 the World Bank estimated that Uganda on average lost US$300m per year as a result of political sycophancy. In 2007, Uganda’s Transparency International Index placed it 111th out of 180 countries, however this worsened in 2008, when it ranked 126th out of 180 countries (Olanyo, 2008:Internet). In the survey section of the Ugandan Self-Assessment Report 2005, almost half of the respondents reported that bribes were more frequently demanded at the time of the survey than five years ago (Olupot 2008: Internet). The report stated, ‘corruption…has adversely impacted on the effectiveness of services meant to improve the quality of life, especially in health and education…It has additionally influenced death and poverty levels in Uganda’(Olupot, 2008: Internet). As can be seen, arbitrariness, a lack of proper democratic participation and corruption all have significant sociopolitical consequences for Ugandan’s population.
What needs to be institutionalised in Uganda is an effective system of checks and balances on arbitrary political power. There needs to be more accountability on the part of the government, and greater transparency in public policy. The fact that Museveni has changed the constitution to suit his own interests is reflective of an argument made by academic Sabiti Makara, who claims that there is a class of political elite in Africa who believe that
the constitution and the people are there to serve the government, rather than it being the other way round ( Makara, 2009: 57). This institutionalised idea is something that needs to be changed.
There are various avenues through which such change is possible. Uganda has a free press, which has played a significant role in drawing attention to governmental corruption, and dissatisfaction with the government’s neopatrimonial culture. In terms of governmental change in the 2011 national elections, and whether it can bring about a transformation in governing culture, it has been stated that the opposition party to the National Resistance Movement(NRM) is not organised enough at present to be a viable contender(Makara, 2009: 58). Funding for parties attempting to run against the government has also been an issue, and the NRM has previously been accused of unfairly utilising state resources to advance their own political agenda. However, academic Sabiti Makara states that, ‘in societies such as Uganda where strongman tendencies have been the norm rather than an exception…the opposition parties will need to press for more transparency in public funding, electoral reforms, and change in the attitudes of some of the state institution’(Makara, 2009:73).
Poverty, civil unrest and the prevalence of neopatrimonial politics in Uganda are all important issues that pose challenges to Uganda’s development . In terms of poverty, the government needs to adopt a more empathetic approach to income inequality and long term poverty problems, whilst more seriously examine the merits of pro-poor growth. Ending the civil unrest in Uganda is said to involve a tension between peace and justice, and although Joseph Kony should face prosecution by the ICC, this is problematic if it means the conflict will be drawn out further. Finally, in order to challenge neopatrimonial politics in Uganda, there needs to be larger institutional change. A new government (whether or not this is likely), and the influence of the free press are possible means through which this can occur.
Reference List
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Gordon,D.,2007. ‘African Politics’, in A. Gordon and D. Gordon (eds.), Understanding Contemporary Africa. Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado.
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Nannyonjo,J. 2004. Conflicts, Poverty and Human Development in Northern Uganda. http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2005/en_GB/rp2005-47/_files/78091760398042569/default/rp2005-47.pdf. Accessed 29/10/09.
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Olupot, 2008. Uganda: corruption Costs Sh500b a Year. http://allafrica.com/stories/200801220042.html. Accessed 27/10/09.
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. Yes, just the other day I got the following email:
